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Abstract
This paper surveys the empirical research on ﬁscal policy analysis based on real-time
data. This literature can be broadly divided in three groups that focus on: (1) the statis-
tical properties of revisions in ﬁscal data; (2) the political and institutional determinants
of projection errors by governments and (3) the reaction of ﬁscal policies to the business
cycle. It emerges that, ﬁrst, ﬁscal data revisions are large and initial releases are biased
estimates of ﬁnal values. Second, the presence of strong ﬁscal rules and institutions leads
to relatively more accurate releases of ﬁscal data and small deviations of ﬁscal outcomes
from government plans. Third, the cyclical stance of ﬁscal policies is estimated to be more
‘counter-cyclical’ when real-time data are used instead of ex-post data. Finally, more work
is needed for the development of real-time datasets for ﬁscal policy analysis. In particular,
a comprehensive real-time dataset including ﬁscal variables for industrialized (and possibly
developing) countries, published and maintained by central banks or other institutions, is
still missing.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E62, H60, H68
Keywords: Fiscal policy, real-time data, data revisions, cyclical sensitivity.5
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Non-technical summary  
 
This paper surveys the empirical research on fiscal policy based on real-time data, i.e., on data available to 
policymakers when budgetary decisions were taken.  
The literature on fiscal policy and real-time data can be divided into three main groups, according to the 
main focus of each paper. These three groups focus respectively on: (1) the statistical properties of 
revisions in fiscal data, i.e., on the properties of deviations of ex-post outcomes from current-year estimates 
and estimates for previous years of fiscal variables; (2) the political and institutional determinants of 
revisions for current-year estimates and of forecast errors by governments, defined as deviations of ex-post 
outcomes from governments' fiscal plans for the next year; (3) the evaluation of the ex-ante vs. ex-post 
cyclical stance of fiscal policies, defined as the reaction of fiscal policies to business cycle fluctuations.  
The main findings from this literature are the following. First, revisions in fiscal data tend to be large and 
can be often predicted based on ex-ante information. Otherwise stated, revisions seem to `reduce noise' 
rather than `add news.' It is also generally found that initial releases by the national statistical authorities 
are biased estimates of the final values. Second, the presence of strong fiscal rules (establishing, for 
example, expenditure ceilings) and institutions (such as medium-term budgetary frameworks) tends to be 
associated with relatively accurate releases of fiscal data and small real-time projection errors by 
governments and national institutions. Third, more papers now use fiscal plans reported at the time of 
budgeting for the estimation of fiscal policy reaction functions. In this context, it emerges that the ex-ante 
reaction of fiscal policies to the economic cycle is found to be more `counter-cyclical' when real-time data 
are used - especially as regards the fiscal policy `instrument' - instead of ex-post data. 
Regarding the availability of real-time datasets for fiscal policy analysis, more work is needed. In 
particular, a comprehensive real-time dataset including fiscal variables for industrialized (and possibly 
developing) countries, published and maintained by central banks or other institutions, is at the current 
stage still missing. 6
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Orphanides (2001), Croushore and Stark (2001)a n dOrphanides and
van Norden (2002), research employing real-time data has soared in the literature on monetary
policy. However, despite the fact that problems related to data revisions and the timeliness of
information clearly matter also for ﬁscal policy, papers on real-time data and ﬁscal policy analysis
have appeared only in recent years. The goal of this paper is to survey this still relatively narrow,
but rapidly growing, empirical literature.
The literature on ﬁscal policy and real-time data can be divided into three main groups,
according to the main focus of each paper: (1) the ﬁrst group includes papers on the statistical
properties of revisions in ﬁscal data, i.e., on the properties of deviations of ex-post outcomes from
current-year estimates and estimates for previous years of ﬁscal variables; (2) the second group
focuses on the political and institutional determinants of revisions for current-year estimates
and of one-year-ahead forecast errors by governments, deﬁned as deviations of ex-post outcomes
from governments’ ﬁscal plans for the next year;1 (3) the third group includes papers on the
evaluation of the ex-ante vs. ex-post cyclical stance of ﬁscal policies, i.e., on the reaction of ﬁscal
policies to business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Other papers using real-time data for ﬁscal policy analysis will not be classiﬁed in these three
categories, since their main focus is on diﬀerent issues. For example, papers that propose ways
to disentangle the ‘automatic’ vs. ‘discretionary’ component of ﬁscal policy through real-time
data and papers on the use of real-time data for the identiﬁcation of ﬁscal shocks in structural
VAR models are included in this group. These works will be discussed in a separate section at
the end of the paper.2
1Part of the real-time ﬁscal literature overlaps with the literature on ﬁscal forecasting. A complete overview
of the literature on ﬁscal forecasting is outside the scope of the present work (see Leal, P´ erez, Tujula, and
Vidal (2008) for an exhaustive survey on the ﬁscal forecasting literature). Here, only papers on one-year-ahead
government ﬁscal plans (i.e., projections) and on deviations of such plans from ex-post outcomes are considered.
In fact, the bulk of budgetary measures for year t + 1 is approved by governments at the end of year t in their
annual budget law. Therefore, one-year-ahead oﬃcial projections reveal important information on the budgetary
stance that authorities plan, in real time, for the following year.
2Like any other type of classiﬁcation, the one proposed in this survey is also arbitrary to some extent. In
particular, it can be the case that a single paper addresses diﬀerent issues. However, an approach that focuses7
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With few exceptions, the literature on ﬁscal policy and real-time data has thus far analyzed
industrialized countries. Therefore, the survey will focus on this set of countries. Within this
literature, most papers have been devoted to the analysis of countries belonging to the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Union (EU), also because European
authors have mainly worked in this ﬁeld. This fact is not surprising, given the stronger interest
in Europe in issues related to revisions in ﬁscal indicators, to ﬁscal slippages with respect to
government plans and to the stance of ﬁscal policies over the economic cycle.
Indeed, ﬁscal data reporting plays a central role in the multilateral surveillance framework
in Europe, which underpins the EMU with a view of ensuring ﬁscal discipline in member states.
Adherence to the EU’s ﬁscal rules is assessed upon ﬁrst releases of ﬁscal data in national accounts
terms.3 In addition, EU governments’ medium-term ﬁscal plans are regularly monitored by
supra-national institutions (i.e., the European Commission and the ECOFIN Council) to ensure
that ﬁscal developments are in line with countries’ commitments under the EU’s ﬁscal framework.
Therefore, frequent and sizeable revisions of ﬁscal data - and large deviations of ﬁscal outcomes
from ex-ante plans - may jeopardize the credibility of the EU’s surveillance framework. Against
this background, the analysis of revisions in ﬁscal data and of the deviations of ﬁscal outcomes
from governments’ plans has attracted much attention in the policy and academic debate in
Europe.
The cyclical stance of ﬁscal policies has also been at the center of the research agenda
over recent years, especially in Europe. Again, this can be explained by the adoption of the
EU’s system of ﬁscal rules, which deﬁne how ﬁscal policies should behave over certain phases
on the main object of interest of each paper has the advantage that it simpliﬁes the overview of the existing
literature.
3An important distinction needs to be done regarding the nature of ﬁscal data. Indeed, ﬁscal data can be
typically recorded according to the ‘accrual’ (i.e., national account) or ‘cash’ principle. Accrual data refer to the
moment in which the economic transaction, which leads for example to a tax liability, takes place. Cash data
refer to the moment in which the Treasury pays government expenditures, or when it receives tax payments. For
the same economic transaction, there is generally a time lag between the accrual and the cash ﬂow. In addition,
cash data (which are often available at the monthly frequency) are generally not-revised. At the same time,
accrual data (typically available at the quarterly or annual frequency) are subject to large revisions. While some
interesting papers have recently appeared on the use of cash data for ﬁscal policy analysis (see, e.g., Onorante,
Pedregal, Prez, and Signorini (2010); Hughes-Hallett, Kuhn, and Warmedinger (2010)), this survey focuses on
accrual data as these data are predominantly used for the ﬁscal surveillance process in most countries.8
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of the business cycle.4 In this context, some commentators have argued that the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP), and in particular the 3% ceiling on the government deﬁcit-to-GDP
ratio, might induce pro-cyclical budgeting during downturns (see, e.g., Eichengreen and Wyplosz
(1998)).5 Against the normative background of the SGP and the criticisms put forward by some
authors on its implications for the cyclical stance of ﬁscal policies, there has been an increasing
interest in investigating how ﬁscal policies have reacted to the economic cycle, especially since
the introduction of the SGP. In particular, some authors have focused on how the reaction of
ﬁscal policies to the economy as planned in real time has diﬀered from what has been observed
ex-post, based on revised data.
This paper is close in spirit to the surveys by Croushore (2011)a n dGolinelli and Momigliano
(2009). However, while the former paper covers a vast macroeconomic literature based on real-
time data, it does not include papers on ﬁscal policy. Golinelli and Momigliano (2009)f o c u s
on the issue of cyclicality for euro area ﬁscal policies and review papers based on both ex-post
and ex-ante data. The present survey does not include papers based (only) on ex-post data,
but it reviews a wider literature on ﬁscal policy and real-time data. In particular, papers not
speciﬁcally related to the cyclical stance of ﬁscal policies are also analyzed. In addition, papers
on non-euro-area industrialized countries are also reviewed here.
The main ﬁndings from the literature on real-time data and ﬁscal policy are the following.
First, revisions in ﬁscal data tend to be large and can be often predicted based on ex-ante
information; i.e., revisions seem to ‘reduce noise’ rather than ‘add news.’ It is also generally
found that initial releases by the national statistical authorities are biased estimates of the
ﬁnal values. Second, the presence of strong ﬁscal rules (establishing, for example, expenditure
ceilings) and institutions (such as medium-term budgetary frameworks) tends to be associated
4In particular, the Stability and Growth Pact recommends that - in order to reach their ‘Medium-Term’
budgetary objectives of balanced budget positions - EU members states are required to pursue ﬁscal adjustment
eﬀorts that are more ambitious in good economic times than in downturns; i.e., ﬁscal consolidation should be
strongly counter-cyclical during buoyant phases of the economic cycle.
5According to this argument, the necessity to abide by the 3% deﬁcit rule may force governments to cut
expenditures and increase taxes during periods in which aggregate demand is already weak.9
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with relatively accurate current-year estimates of ﬁscal data and small real-time projection errors
by governments and national institutions. Third, more papers now use ﬁscal plans reported at
the time of budgeting for the estimation of ﬁscal policy reaction functions. In this context,
it emerges that the ex-ante reaction of ﬁscal policies to the economic cycle is found to be
more ‘counter-cyclical’ when real-time data are used - especially as regards the ﬁscal policy
‘instrument’ - instead of ex-post data. Finally, it emerges that real-time ﬁscal data can be
used for several other applications related, for example, to the estimation of the ‘automatic’
vs. ‘discretionary’ component of ﬁscal policy, to the testing of predictions from macroeconomic
theory, to the analysis of interdependence in ﬁscal plans, or to the identiﬁcation of ﬁscal shocks
in structural VAR models.
In general, the survey is structured following a chronological approach, with a view to pre-
senting papers following the time of their ﬁrst appearance as working papers or monographs.
Overall, this survey aims at oﬀering a comprehensive overview of the research in the ﬁeld of
ﬁscal policy analysis and real-time data.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to presenting the available
real-time datasets on ﬁscal variables. In section 3, the literature on revisions in ﬁscal data is
discussed. Section 4 covers papers on the political and institutional determinants of projection
errors. Section 5 is devoted to papers on the cyclical stance of ﬁscal policies. Section 6 reviews
papers on other heterogeneous issues. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Available real-time datasets for ﬁscal variables
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are ﬁve datasets that include real-time ﬁscal vari-
ables, which are publicly available and constantly updated. Two of these datasets are on the
US, one is on the aggregate euro area and on seven single euro area countries (Austria, Bel-
gium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands), one on the UK, and one on a larger
6Some papers may have been unintentionally overlooked. In fact, this is a still rather narrow, but rapidly
growing, empirical literature. I apologize in advance to the authors for possible omissions.10
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set of industrialized (OECD) countries. More speciﬁcally, the available real-time datasets for
the US are the Philadelphia Fed’s real-time dataset for macroeconomists7 and the St. Louis
Fed’s ALFRED database.8 For the aggregate euro area and single euro area countries, there is
the ECB-EABCN’s area wide real-time dataset.9 For the UK, there is the Bank of England’s
gross domestic product real-time database.10 Finally, there is the OECD’s real-time data and
revisions dataset, which covers a larger set of industrialized countries.11
Focusing on ﬁscal variables, table 1 summarizes coverage of these ﬁve datasets, in terms of
countries and variables. The year of the ﬁrst available vintage is also reported for each variable.
The Philadelphia Fed’s dataset covers only the US and includes real-time data on real govern-
ment consumption and investment, at both the federal and state/local level. These data are also
published in the St. Louis Fed’s ALFRED database, which in addition reports data for the US
government’s net borrowing (i.e., the government budget deﬁcit) at the federal and state/local
level, and its decompostion between total government revenue and expenditure.12 Moreover,
the St. Louis Fed’s dataset is the only one that includes a real-time series for government debt,
with vintages starting in 1997. The EABCN’s dataset is based on the series published in the
ECB’s Monthly Bulletin for the aggregate euro area and on data collected by National Central
Banks (NCBs) for single euro area countries.13 The data frequency is quarterly and annual.
Data are published in an updated form each month. Data for the aggregate euro area include
the general government deﬁcit, total revenues and expenditures, and government consumption
and investment. Data for single euro area countries are generally available only for government
consumption. Vintages are available only as of 2001 for the aggregate euro area and for most in-
7See Croushore and Stark (2001). Data are available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
data/real-time-center/real-time-data/.
8Data are available at http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/category?cid=1.
9See Giannone, Henry, Lalik, and Modugno (2011). Data are available on the EABCN and ECB website at
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=4843525 and http://www.eabcn.org/data/rtdb/index.htm.
10Data are available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/gdpdatabase/.
11Data are available at http://stats.oecd.org/mei/default.asp?rev=1.
12The government’s net borrowing is equal to the diﬀerence between total government revenue and expenditure,
which results in a deﬁcit (surplus) if such diﬀerence is negative (positive).
13Data for the UK are also reported in this dataset, which reﬂects data published in the Bank of England’s
gross domestic product real-time database.11
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dividual countries. For a few countries (e.g., Italy) earlier vintages are also presented. The Bank
of England’s dataset covers only the UK. It includes quarterly series for the general government
net lending, and for government consumption and investment. This dataset spans vintages back
to 1990. Finally, the OECD’s dataset is based on the ‘Main Economic Indicators’ publication.
It includes real-time data for each OECD country but only for government consumption. For
this dataset, the ﬁrst available vintage diﬀers across countries.
In sum, while the interest in real-time data for ﬁscal policy analysis has grown over recent
years, the publicly available sources still oﬀer a rather limited amount of real-time data for
empirical research in the ﬁscal policy ﬁeld. In particular, data on European countries are often
missing, especially as regards some key ﬁscal variables such as government debt, government
net lending and government cyclically adjusted primary balance.14 In addition, most of these
publicly available datasets have been published only in recent years.15
For these reasons, most of the (especially early) researchers in this ﬁeld constructed ‘ad-hoc’
real-time datasets for ﬁscal variables. Authors often collected real-time data from hard copies
of various oﬃcial publications. Three main sources of data have been used: (1) the OECD
Economic Outlook for all industrialized countries; (2) Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure Notiﬁcations
and (3) Stability and Convergence Programmes for EU countries. The OECD Economic Out-
look (EO) is published bi-annually and reports past data, estimates for the current year, and
forecasts for one- and two-years-ahead horizons for many ﬁscal variables (e.g., government bal-
ances, government debt, total government revenues and expenditures). Based on past issues
of the OECD EO, for example, Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) built a real-time dataset for
the government primary balance. Cimadomo (2007) collected real-time series for the general
government debt and the cyclically adjusted primary balance, as a measure of the ex-ante or
planned cyclical stance.
14The cyclically adjusted balance is typically deﬁned as a ‘structural’ balance when one-oﬀ and temporary
measures are netted out from it. Given that the cyclically adjusted balance and the structural balance tend to
be very similar, in the rest of the paper the two terms are used interchangeably.
15For example, the OECD real-time database is available as of 2006. The ECB-EABCN real-time database has
been available only since 2009.12
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Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure (EDP) Notiﬁcations data for the general government deﬁcit
and debt are published twice per year (in April and October) by the European Commission
(Eurostat), which collects and validates data reported by single EU member states. EDP data
comprise ﬁgures for the current year t, forecasts for year t + 1 and past data. Figures back
to year t − 4 are subject to revision in each EDP release. EDP data have a key role in the
context of the EU ﬁscal surveillance framework. In fact, based on these data, and according to
the provisions of the SGP, the European Council may decide to initiate an ‘Excessive Deﬁcit
Procedure’ against the countries that have deviated from the reference value of a government
deﬁcit of 3% of GDP in the base year t, and whose deﬁcit is not expected to be corrected over
a given forecast horizon.16 An example of a paper using EDP Notiﬁcations data is de Castro,
P´ erez, and Rodr´ ıguez (2011), which analyzed the statistical properties of revisions for deﬁcit
ﬁgures for several EU countries.
The third main sources of real-time data are the annual updates of the EU’s Stability and
Convergence programmes. Under the provisions of the ‘preventive arm’ of the SGP, euro-area
member states are indeed requested to prepare annual stability programmes and other EU mem-
ber states are requested to prepare convergence programmes and submit them to the European
Commission and the ECOFIN Council by the end of each year.17 Stability and Convergence
programmes report ﬁgures for the past year, current-year estimates and projections up to year
t + 3 for several ﬁscal indicators including the general government budget balance and debt,
the cyclically adjusted balance, total government revenues and expenditure. The programmes
are scrutinized and assessed by the European Commission and the ECOFIN Council to detect
budgetary imbalances that could imply risks for ﬁscal sustainability. The aim is to ensure rigor-
ous budgetary discipline through surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies within the
euro area and EU. Based on this source, for example, Holm-Hadulla, Hauptmeier, and Rother
16For a more detailed description of the EU ﬁscal framework see, e.g., Morris, Ongena, and Schuknecht (2006).
17As of 2011, programmes will be submitted to the Ecoﬁn council by the end of March, in the context of the
so-called ‘European semester’. The European semester is one of the ﬁrst initiatives that emerged from a task force
chaired by the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, with a view to strengthening European
provisions on economic governance.13
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(2011) constructed a real-time dataset for government expenditure for EU countries.
Finally, other authors used alternative sources. For example, Loukoianova, Vahey, and
Wakerly (2003) - one of the ﬁrst papers to carry out ﬁscal policy analysis with real-time data
- employed a real-time dataset for the US government primary balance which was collected by
the authors based on another oﬃcial publication, the ‘Economic Report of the US President.’
For the Netherlands, Beetsma, Giuliodori, Walschot, and Wierts (2010) collected ﬁscal plans
released by the Dutch Ministry of Finance and reported in annual budget laws.
3 Revisions in ﬁscal data
This section reviews the ﬁrst group of papers, which focus on the statistical properties of revisions
in ﬁscal data. To facilitate the discussion, the following notation will be used. Let f denote a
generic ﬁscal variable, for example, the government budget balance. Let ft|v be the value of f
for time t released by the government or a statistical agency in vintage v. Fiscal variables are
typically reported at quarterly or annual frequency (see also table 1). Therefore, t will refer to
a certain quarter or a year. Instead, the frequency of data releases can be monthly, quarterly,
semi-annual or annual.18 As discussed below, most of the empirical research on revisions in ﬁscal
data focuses on annual data, released annually or semi-annually.19 The notation ft|T refers to
the ﬁnal or ‘true’ value for f, which is released at the end of the observation period (i.e., at time
T). The term ‘ﬁrst release’ is generally used to refer to data for year t published at the end of
year t or at the beginning of year t + 1. The following identity will hold





t|v is the revision between the ﬁnal vintage T and v.20 If v = t, ft|t is the current-year
18For example, the EABCN dataset reports quarterly data for aggregate euro area ﬁscal variables. Data are
collected each month from the ECB Monthly Bulletin and therefore reported at the monthly frequency.
19This is the case of research based on data from the OECD Economic Outlook, from EDP deﬁcit notiﬁcations
or from Stability and Convergence Programmes for EU countries.
20The real-time literature sometimes refers to u
f as a ‘revision error’ (see, e.g., Orphanides and van Norden14
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estimate (i.e., ”nowcast”) of f and u
f
t|t its revision. If v>t , ft|v is a release of past data for f
and u
f
t|v the related revision. If v<t , ft|v is a forecast for f and u
f
t|v will be the related forecast
error. When v = t − 1, u
f
t|v is the one-year-ahead forecast error.21
One of the main diﬀerences between the one-year-ahead forecast error and revisions for the
current year or past years is that the forecast error can be aﬀected by new ﬁscal measures that
are announced and implemented after the cut-oﬀ date of the forecast. Clearly, this source of
errors will not aﬀect the estimates for the past years or the current year, especially if the latter
are produced at the end of the year. In this case, all ﬁscal measures will be included in the
information set of the statistician at the time of the data release.
In the following, the literature on revisions for the main ﬁscal variables - namely, the gov-
ernment deﬁcit, debt and the cyclically-adjusted deﬁcit - is reviewed.22
3.1 Revisions for the government deﬁcit and debt
The literature shows that data revisions for the general government deﬁcit and debt are often very
large. Figure 1, taken from de Castro, P´ erez, and Rodr´ ıguez (2011), displays subsequent revisions
for the general government budget balance in Greece, over the period 1999-2009. Numbers are
sometimes striking. Revisions amount to more than 3 percentage points of GDP in years 2000-
2003 and at the end of the sample. For example, in only six months, between April and October
2009, the government budget balance reported by Greek authorities to Eurostat for 2008 was
revised downward from -5% of GDP to around -8% of GDP. Revisions for the 2009 ﬁgure (not
shown) were even more impressive, with the estimated 2009 balance plunging from -3% of GDP
(2002)a n dGiannone, Reichlin, and Small (2005)). In this paper, the terms ‘revision’ and ‘revision error’ will be
used interchangeably.
21Estimates for the same year are sometimes referred to as ”forecasts” (see, e.g., Pina and Venes (2011)). Here,
the term ”current-year estimates” is used to distinguish the estimates for the same year from the ”one-year-ahead”
forecasts. The related errors are therefore also deﬁned as ”revisions”.
22One additional important ﬁscal variable is government consumption. The latter is computed as the sum of
compensation of public employees, intermediate consumption and other minor components (e.g. social transfers in
kind). While government consumption is a relevant ﬁscal variable - given that it is a component of GDP - there is
little literature on revisions to this indicator. Exceptions are Kholodilin and Siliverstovs (2009), ller and Hansson
(2004)a n dSleeman (2006) who analyze the properties of revisions for government consumption for, respectively,
Germany, Sweden and New Zealand. All the three papers show that revisions to government consumption explain
an important share of revisions to GDP for these three countries.15
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to more than -10% of GDP between the April 2009 release and following releases. The Greek case
is certainly extreme, but sizeable revisions have also been recorded in other cases. For example,
Figure 2a shows - for the aggregate euro area and for the period 1998-2009 - the oﬃcial current-
year estimate for the government budget balance in addition to government forecasts for years
t+1, t+2 and t+3. Data are based on national Stability and Convergence programmes published
by euro area governments at the end of each year. It clearly emerges that, on average, current-
year estimates (and projections) reported by euro area governments often diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from actual outcomes. In the period 1998-2003 this was mainly due to revenue shortfalls, given
that real-time estimates of government revenues turned out to be in general overly optimistic
(see Figure 2c). For the last period, slippages were mainly explained by government expenditure
being estimated ex-ante to be lower than what was observed ex-post (see Figure 2b).
One of the earlier works on the analysis of revisions in ﬁscal data is Gordo-Mora and
Nogueira-Martins (2007). The authors follow a descriptive approach to study deﬁcit and debt
ﬁgures reported in EDP Notiﬁcations by 14 EU countries to Eurostat since 1994 and for the
period 1990-2005. It emerges that France, Germany and the United Kingdom reported the most
reliable deﬁcit/surplus ﬁgures over this period. Denmark, Portugal, Luxembourg and Sweden
are the countries that had the largest dispersion of revisions. It is also shown that for several
countries, notably Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal, data on the yearly changes
in debt have been more reliable than those on the deﬁcit. Finally, the authors ﬁnd no evidence
of diﬀerences in revision patterns before and after the methodological shift from the European
System of Accounts (ESA) 79 to ESA 95, which occurred in 2000.
Balassone, Franco, and Zotteri (2007)a n dvon Hagen and Wolﬀ (2006) focus on revisions to
ﬁrst releases of deﬁcit data for some EU countries and on a comparison between the government
deﬁcit and changes in government debt, i.e., the so-called deﬁcit-debt or stock-ﬂow adjustment.
Both papers suggest that stock-ﬂow adjustments have been used strategically by EU governments
to meet the 3% deﬁcit threshold in real-time. This resulted in opportunistic accounting that16
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often yielded to an ex-ante underestimation of the budget deﬁcits. In particular, von Hagen and
Wolﬀ (2006) ﬁnd that the practice of hiding budget deﬁcit deteriorations through stock-ﬂow
adjustments is especially strong in times of recession, as the cost of restrictive policies tends to
be larger in these phases of the business cycle.
The statistical properties of revisions in deﬁcit ﬁgures are analyzed by de Castro, P´ erez,
and Rodr´ ıguez (2011) based on an approach similar to one proposed by Croushore and Stark
(2001)a n dAruoba (2008). The paper focuses on 15 EU countries and uses data from EDP
Notiﬁcations. The dataset is constructed based on past vintages of EDP data from spring 1999
to autumn 2009, covering the period 1995-2008. Results indicate that revisions of deﬁcit data are
frequent and are characterized by a negative bias: ﬁnal releases tend to display lower surpluses or
higher deﬁcits than initial notiﬁcations, although dispersion among and within countries seems
to be large. In addition, it is shown that revisions in government balance ﬁgures, rather than
being primarily caused by revisions in GDP ﬁgures, embed a systematic and important ﬁscal
component. Finally, the analysis suggests that revisions in government deﬁcit data seem to
reduce noise, rather than adding news, given that such revisions are correlated with ex-ante
information and can be predicted.23
The ﬁnding that revisions to ﬁscal data tend to reduce noise, rather than adding news,
emerges also in Garratt and Vahey (2006) for a study on the UK. Based on the quarterly
real-time dataset constructed for the UK by Castle and Ellis (2002) and spanning the period
1961Q3-1999Q2, the authors characterize the relationships between preliminary and subsequent
measurements for 16 commonly used UK macroeconomic indicators, including government ex-
penditure. They show that revisions for UK government expenditure tend to have zero mean
but a mean absolute value larger than GDP. Also in this case, revisions appear to be predictable
on the basis of ex-ante information.
23As discussed in Croushore (2011), data revisions are typically described as adding news or reducing noise.I f
data revisions contain news, it means they are not predictable on the basis of the information set held by the
statistician at the time of the data release, i.e. u
f
t|v ⊥ ft|v. If data revisions reduce noise, they can be correlated
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As regards revisions to the government debt-to-GDP ratio, Cimadomo (2007) shows that -
based on a dataset for 19 OECD countries over the period 1995-2006 - the debt ratio reported
by the OECD at the end of year t for the same year is often remarkably diﬀerent from what was
observed at the end of the sample, due to errors in measurement but also to possible changes in
accounting rules (see column 4 of table 2).24 Revisions to this indicator are the largest for high
debt countries such as Greece and Japan but also for Norway.
3.2 Revisions for the cyclically adjusted primary balance
The cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) and cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB)a r e
typically used in empirical research to capture the ‘discretionary’ component of ﬁscal policy (see,
e.g., Gal´ ı and Perotti (2003)). The CAB is computed as the diﬀerence between the nominal
balance and its automatic or cyclical component, which is assumed to be independent from
government interventions (within the same year). The CAB is typically estimated as a function
of the output gap. It therefore incorporates three main sources of uncertainty: the nominal
output, the potential output, and the headline nominal deﬁcit. The CAPB is equal to the CAB
minus interest payments.
In Cimadomo (2007), I provide evidence on the size of revisions for the current-year esti-
mate and the one-year-ahead forecast of the CAPB, and for the current-year estimate of the
government debt and the output gap, based on data reported in the OECD EO. Table 2 -t a k e n
from that paper - shows that countries for which the output gap has been poorly measured tend
to also display large revisions and forecast errors for the CAPB (see, e.g., Italy, Portugal and
Japan).
The CAB also has a key role in the EU ﬁscal surveillance framework.25 The use of the
24For example, a change in the statistical deﬁnition of general government gross debt (government gross ﬁnancial
liabilities) for Canada occurred in 2002. Before 2002, funded government employees’ pension liabilities were
included in government gross debt, whereas these have been netted out by the OECD starting from 2002 to
ensure consistency with other countries.
25Under the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, which entered into force in 2005, EU member states are
requested to present their country-speciﬁc ‘medium-term objective (MTO)’ for the government budget balance in
their annual stability or convergence programme. Such medium-term objectives are deﬁned in cyclically adjusted
and net of one-oﬀ and other temporary factors. In addition, the SGP states that member states that have not18
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CAB as a real-time ﬁscal surveillance tool for EU countries is investigated in Larch and Turrini
(2010)a n dHughes-Hallett, Kattai, and Lewis (2011). Larch and Turrini (2010) highlights that
the performance of this indicator has been overall disappointing, given that - especially due to
errors in measuring the cyclical position in real time - the CAB did not always provide accurate
signals of member states’ ﬁscal performance. Hughes-Hallett, Kattai, and Lewis (2011) questions
the use of cyclically-adjusted indicators as surveillance tools in early-warning systems. This is
due to diﬃculties in providing accurate estimates of cyclically-adjusted indicators in real-time.
In particular, the authors ﬁnd that around half of the real-time errors in cyclically adjusted
balances can be attributed to revisions in the cyclical component of the budget balance, and the
other half to revisions in the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio across vintages.
4 Determinants of real-time forecast errors
This section reviews papers on the political and institutional determinants underlying revisions
for current-year estimates (or nowcasts) and one-year-ahead forecast errors by governments.
Revisions for current-year releases of ﬁscal data are generally driven by methodological im-
provements and by updates in the data sources. Deviations of ﬁscal outcomes from government
plans are mainly inﬂuenced by forecast errors, due to model uncertainty or unexpected shocks.26
However, in some cases, and in particular for what concerns the government budget balance,
inaccurate releases of data for the current year - and biased projections for future years - may
be the consequence of political interference in the production of statistics. This is the case es-
yet achieved their MTOs are expected to take steps to do so over the cycle. To this end, euro area and ERM II
member states should, as a benchmark, pursue an annual adjustment in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-oﬀ
and temporary measures, of 0.5% of GDP (see also Morris, Ongena, and Schuknecht (2006)).
26Cebotari, Davis, Lusinyan, Mati, Mauro, Petrie, and Velloso (2009) investigates some sources of deviations
of outcomes from government plans for the government debt, based on a large panel of developed and developing
countries. The paper shows that an important role in accounting for such deviations is attributable to exchange
rate ﬂuctuations and contingent liabilities. The former channel suggests that an unexpected exchange rate de-
preciation tends to increase signiﬁcantly the real value of public debt, if the share of debt in foreign currency is
sizeable. The latter channel is related to obligations triggered by an uncertain event, which include both explicit
liabilities, i.e. those deﬁned by law or contract (e.g. debt guarantees) and implicit liabilities, i.e. moral or ex-
pected obligations for the government, based on public expectations or pressures (e.g. bailouts of banks or public
sector entities).19
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pecially in Europe, given that adherence to the EU’s system of ﬁscal rules is judged based on
ﬁrst releases of data and projections for the next year for the general government deﬁcit. This
may eventually lead to creative accounting and ﬁscal gimmickry by governments and national
statistical agencies, with the goal of meeting the SGP requirements in real time. In this context,
it is often shown that the presence of strong ﬁscal rules and institutions tends to be associated
with more accurate releases of ﬁscal data and ﬁscal projections by governments.
The literature has devoted considerable attention to studying the determinants of one-year-
ahead government forecast errors and, to a lesser extent, revisions to current-year estimates and




t|v =Θ Xt|t +  , (2)
where u
f
t|v is the revision for the current year (or past years) for f (if v ≥ t) or the one-year-
ahead forecast error (if v = t − 1), where Xt|t represents a set of ex-ante explanatory variables
with Θ the associated vector of coeﬃcients, and where   is a residual component. The vector
Xt|t typically includes political and institutional variables such as the government’s political
orientation or a ﬁscal rule index.
One of the earlier works on the performance of budgetary projections by EU member states
- and on the political and institutional determinants of the related forecast errors - is Strauch,
Hallerberg, and von Hagen (2004).27 Based on Stability and Convergence programmes presented
by EU governments over the period 1991-2002, the authors show that forecasts exhibit diﬀerent
patterns of accuracy and biases across countries.28 In addition, the authors show that the form
of ﬁscal governance is an important determinant of biases in budgetary forecasts: forecasts
27Other previous papers have been devoted to ﬁscal forecasting issues (see in particular Artis and Marcellino
(2001)). However, the political and institutional determinants of forecasting errors are generally not investigated
in these papers.
28In particular, according to the paper, few countries predicted actual developments rather well (Denmark,
Sweden, the UK and partly the Netherlands). Other countries tended to report optimistic forecasts compared to
outcomes over this time period. Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Greece fall into this latter group.20
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are more cautious in delegation, contract and mixed governance structures than in fragmented
systems.
Br¨ uck and Stephan (2006) analyze the determinants of one-year-ahead forecast errors for
the general government deﬁcit for a panel of 15 euro area countries plus Japan and the US, for
the period 1995-2003. The data sources are the spring and autumn European Commission’s
forecasts. The paper shows that, since the adoption of the SGP in 1999, euro area governments
have manipulated deﬁcit forecasts before elections. The paper ﬁnds that the political orientation
aﬀects the quality of forecasts: governments moving to the right (left) tend to make more
pessimistic (optimistic) forecasts. In addition, it emerges that minority governments in euro
area countries tend to make overly optimistic forecasts.
The role of ﬁscal institutions and ﬁscal governance for the accuracy of current-year ﬁscal
projections by EU governments is also investigated by Pina and Venes (2011) based, in this
case, on data from EDP Notiﬁcations for the period 1994-2006. The authors show that current-
year estimates for the government deﬁcit are aﬀected by ﬁscal institutions and by opportunistic
motivations, especially since the SGP came into force in 1999. In particular, they ﬁnd that
upcoming elections tend to induce over-optimism. In addition, they show that commitment
or mixed forms of ﬁscal governance and the presence of numerical expenditure rules - which
introduce ceilings on expenditure growth each year - are associated with greater prudence.
Jonung and Larch (2006) focus on a diﬀerent dimension, i.e., on the ‘strategic’ use of real
GDP growth forecasts by EU governments for their ﬁscal projections. They show that, at the
EU level, there is a tendency to overestimate the underlying rate of growth of the economy - and
therefore to underestimate budget deﬁcits - at the moment of preparing the budget. To address
this problem, the authors suggest that GDP forecasting should be assigned to an authority
independent from the government. Then, the government would be obliged to adopt these
forecasts in preparing the oﬃcial budget.
A somewhat diﬀerent conclusion is reached by Moulin and Wierts (2006). The authors claim21
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that, in the EU, the failure to achieve the projected reductions in the general government deﬁcit
primarily reﬂects diﬃculties in adhering to expenditure plans in nominal terms. However, this
does not seem to be due to particularly unfavorable macroeconomic developments, compared
to overly optimistic ex-ante GDP forecasts. As a consequence, the paper points to a need for
strengthening expenditure control mechanisms in most of the EU member states.
The relation between ﬁscal governance and ﬁscal forecasts is inspected by von Hagen (2010),
using current-year estimates and one-year-ahead projections reported in Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes for the period 1998-2004. The paper shows that, within the ﬁscal framework
of the EMU, a trade-oﬀ exists between delegation on the one hand and contracts and strong
rules on the other. Governments operating under contracts and strong rules appear to be more
cautious in their projections than governments operating under delegation. At the same time,
governments operating under delegation are shown to be able to react more eﬀectively to un-
foreseen economic and ﬁscal developments.
Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Wierts (2009) focus on the ‘implementation phase’ of the budget
process. The authors analyze the determinants of governments’ one-year-ahead forecast errors
for the government deﬁcit deﬁned as deviations of the end-of-the-year budget from budget plans
reported in the EU’s Stability and Convergence Programmes at the end of the year before. Using
a dataset of EU countries for the period 1998-2007, they show that ambitious ﬁscal plans and
their implementation beneﬁt from stronger national ﬁscal institutions. This latter ﬁnding is also
highlighted in Beetsma, Bluhm, Giuliodori, and Wierts (2011), who focus on deviations of ex-
post budget outcomes from the end-of-the-year budget. This paper ﬁnds that an improvement
in the quality of institutions reduces the degree of optimism at the ﬁrst-release stage, thereby
making ﬁrst-release ﬁgures more informative about the ﬁnal outcomes.
Beetsma, Giuliodori, Walschot, and Wierts (2010) explore ﬁscal planning and budget im-
plementation in the Netherlands, using a real-time dataset from the annual budget over the
period 1958-2009. The paper shows that, for the Netherlands, planned balances are on average22
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unbiased, although they are overoptimistic during the ﬁrst half of the sample and too pessimistic
during the second half of the sample. The paper underlines that institutional factors play an
important in explaining cautious ﬁscal planning. In particular, it is highlighted that the recent
regime of the ‘trend-based budget policy’ has worked well for ﬁscal discipline in the Netherlands.
Finally, to the best of the author’s knowledge, de Castro, P´ erez, and Rodr´ ıguez (2011)
is the only existing paper on the determinants of revisions for past releases of the general
government deﬁcit. The authors show that political cycles help to explain revision patterns,
with governments tending to hide deﬁcits in electoral and pre-electoral years and when the
economic conditions were unfavorable.
To sum up, the main ﬁndings from this strand of literature are that: (1) one-year-ahead
government ﬁscal projections - as well as releases of ﬁscal data for the current year or past
years - tend to be aﬀected by political and institutional factors. In particular, the presence of
numerical ﬁscal rules (for example, establishing tight expenditure ceilings) and of strong ﬁscal
institutions (such as medium-term budgetary frameworks) is generally associated with more
accurate data releases and ﬁscal forecasts; (2) the form of ﬁscal governance matters, as ﬁscal
projections tend to be more cautious in contract or delegation governance structures than in
fragmented systems and (3) upcoming political elections are often found to induce over-optimism
in ﬁscal projections.
5 Reaction of ﬁscal policies to the economic cycle
A growing number of studies have been devoted to investigating the cyclical stance of ﬁscal
policies using ex-post data and, more recently, real-time data. The underlying idea is to test
whether ﬁscal policies have exerted a stabilizing inﬂuence on the business cycle (i.e., have they
been ‘counter-cyclical’), or whether they have tended to exacerbate economic ﬂuctuations (i.e.,
have they been ‘pro-cyclical’). Earlier studies based on ex-post data tend to indicate that,
in industrialized countries, the cyclical stance of ﬁscal policies appears to be predominantly23
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acyclical or pro-cyclical; i.e., taxes are increased (decreased) and public expenditure decreased
(increased) during economic downturns (upturns).29 The new real-time literature incorporates
ex-ante data for the estimation of ﬁscal policy reaction functions similar to
ft|v = α + βyt|v +Γ Xt|v +  , (3)
where f represents a ﬁscal policy indicator, y a business cycle indicator, X a vector of
other possible control variables and   is a residual component. As before, the subscript t is the
reference year and v the relevant vintage. Ex-post data are typically denoted by the subscript
t|T or t +1 |T,w h e r eT represents the last available vintage. Real-time data are described by the
subscript t|t or t +1 |t indicating, respectively, the current-year estimate and the one-year-ahead
real-time forecast of the concerned variable. In this context, ft+1|t is ﬁscal stance planned at
the time of budgeting for the following year and yt+1|t are the expected cyclical conditions.
Within this literature, many papers focus on the reaction of discretionary ﬁ s c a lp o l i c yt o
economic ﬂuctuations. Hence, f is typically represented by the cyclically adjusted government
(primary) balance. Other papers focus on overall ﬁscal policy, which includes both an automatic
component (through the so-called ‘automatic stabilizers’) and discretionary ﬁscal measures. The
output gap is generally used as a business cycle indicator. The vector X typically includes the
government debt and a larger set of variables thought to inﬂuence ﬁscal policies. For example,
X often includes a dummy variable for election years.
Authors have introduced real-time information for the estimation of ﬁscal policy reaction
functions in various steps. The ﬁrst paper to estimate a ﬁscal policy reaction function based
on real-time data is Forni and Momigliano (2005). The paper uses real-time observations only
for the output gap and ex-post observations for all the other variables. Following the notation
described above, the ﬁscal reaction function here includes ft+1|T, yt+1|t, Xt|T. The idea under-
29See, for example, Lane (2003a), Lane (2003b), European Commission (2004)a n dCimadomo (2005). See
also Corsetti, Meier, and M¨ uller (2010) for an analysis on OECD countries based on ex-post data, pointing to
acyclicality of government spending for most of the countries considered.24
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lying this approach is that the government has full control of its budgetary policies. Thus, what
matters is the actual stance of ﬁscal policy, which in this context is represented by the ex-post
structural balance ft|T. Based on a panel of 19 OECD countries over the period 1993-2003, and
on real-time values for the output gap collected from past issues of the OECD EO, the results
indicate a counter-cyclical stance during economic slowdowns.30
Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) also focus on the actual ﬁscal policy stance for euro area
countries over the period 1994-2008. Therefore, their dependent variable - as in Forni and
Momigliano (2005)-i sft+1|T. However, they include a larger set of factors that may have
inﬂuenced the ﬁscal stance. Among these explanatory factors are two real-time variables: the
output gap and the previous-year government balance budget. As for the other explanatory
variables - which include an index for European ﬁscal rules and the debt ratio - they use ex-
post observations. Their estimates indicate that discretionary ﬁscal policies have reacted in a
stabilizing and symmetrical manner to the business cycle; i.e., there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in the behavior of ﬁscal policy in recessions and expansions.
The use of ex-ante ‘ﬁscal plans’ released at the time of budgeting for the estimation of
the ex-ante ﬁscal policy stance is introduced by Cimadomo (2007).31 The underlying idea is
that ex-ante ﬁscal plans by governments may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ex-post outcomes.32
In fact, the implementation of ﬁscal measures is typically characterized by a high degree of
uncertainty. This depends on the long and often unpredictable time lags between budgetary
decisions and the execution of the budget, which policymakers cannot fully control. In addition,
governments have inaccurate estimates of the state of the economy in real-time, and therefore of
its impact on budget balances through the automatic stabilizers. Hence, the proposed empirical
30See also Marinheiro (2008) for a similar approach, but based on real-time data for the output gap from the
European Commission, for the period 1999-2006.
31See Cimadomo (2011) for an updated version.
32This issue is not relevant for monetary policy. In fact, under normal circumstances, central banks can control
their operating instruments with great accuracy. In particular, short-term interest rates are subject to negligible
revisions, and just for a few days after the ﬁrst release of data. On the contrary, ﬁscal indicators incorporate
diﬀerent sources of uncertainty related in particular to the real-time estimate of output and of the execution of
the budget.25
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analysis is based on ex-ante projections for the cyclically adjusted budget balance (i.e., ft+1|t)
to capture discretionary ﬁscal measures planned ex-ante by ﬁscal policymakers. In general, this
is the ﬁrst paper that uses ex-ante observations for all variables included in the ﬁscal policy
rule (i.e., ft+1|t, yt+1|t, Xt|t), with the view of fully replicating the information set available to
policymakers at the time budgetary decisions were made. Using a dataset of 19 OECD countries
constructed from past issues of the OECD EO for the period 1994-2006, the paper ﬁnds that
governments in industrialized countries plan counter-cyclical ﬁscal policies, especially during
times of expansions.33
The idea of using ﬁscal plans for the estimation of ﬁscal policy reactions has been subse-
quently adopted by other papers. Some of these papers also focus on the cyclical stance of
ﬁscal policies (e.g., Lewis (2009), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), Pina (2009), Holm-Hadulla,
Hauptmeier, and Rother (2011)); some other papers address diﬀerent issues (e.g., Giuliodori
and Beetsma (2008)).
Lewis (2009) investigates the cyclical stance and eﬀect of EU accession for ﬁscal policy
in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The paper uses a real-time dataset con-
structed from the Transition Report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). Fiscal policy rules similar to (2) are estimated where, however, the total ex-ante gov-
ernment budget balance - which therefore also includes the eﬀects of automatic stabilizers - is
employed as a ﬁscal policy indicator. It is found that in CEECs budget balances react in a
stabilizing way to economic activity, and they are less inert than is typically found in Western
Europe. In addition, there is evidence of a ﬁscal loosening in the run-up to EU accession.34
33The paper also shows that the bias arising from the use of ex-post data for the estimation of the ex-ante ﬁscal
stance can be predicted based on second-order moments of ex-ante data and data revisions.
34Lewis (2009) is included in this review, although not all CEECs are considered as mature market economies.
As regards developing countries, few papers have used real-time data for ﬁscal policy analysis. One exception is
Lled´ o and Poplawski-Ribeiro (2011), which uses real-time data to estimate ﬁscal rules for sub-Saharan African
countries. The paper shows that ﬁscal policy implementation gaps in this group of countries tend to be on
average comparable to other regions of the world. As in other regions, planned ﬁscal consolidations tend to be
less ambitious than anticipated and in some cases end in ﬁscal expansions. In addition, it is found that revenue
shortfalls account for the bulk of ﬁscal balance implementation gaps among oil exporters, overspending seems to
dominate in middle-income countries, while a combination of both accounts for higher deﬁcits or lower surpluses
than planned among low-income countries.26
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Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) explore how ﬁscal policies in the OECD have responded to
unexpected information about the economy during the period 1995-2006. In particular, the
authors ﬁrst estimate ﬁscal rules using ex-ante data for all variables, as in Cimadomo (2007).
Then, they assess how ﬁscal policy reacts to new information, especially about the business
cycle. They ﬁnd that there are marked diﬀerences between ex-ante behavior of ﬁscal policies
and responses to new information, as well as between ﬁscal policy of the EU countries and the
other OECD countries. In particular, the EU countries react in a pro-cyclical way to unexpected
changes in the output gap, while the responses of the other OECD countries are acyclical.
Budgetary plans reported in the European Commissions autumn forecasts are used by Pina
(2009) to estimate ﬁscal reaction functions with ex-post and real-time data. In a panel of 15
EU countries from 1987 to 2006, the paper conﬁrms the ﬁnding that moving from plans to ﬁnal
data generally weakens the counter-cyclicality of budget balances. In addition, the paper shows
that this is especially true for government expenditure, though not for revenues. Finally, and
similarly to Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), this work analyzes deviations from plans during
budget implementation. It is shown that updates in ﬁscal plans during the implementation
phase are often driven by electoral opportunism.
The impact of numerical expenditure rules on the propensity of governments to deviate from
expenditure targets in response to surprises in cyclical conditions is explored by Holm-Hadulla,
Hauptmeier, and Rother (2011). The paper starts from the consideration that, due to political
fragmentation in the budgetary process, expenditure policy might be prone to a pro-cyclical bias.
However, this tendency may be mitigated by numerical expenditure rules. These hypotheses are
tested against data from the EU’s Stability and Convergence Programmes. Results suggest
that deviations between actual and planned government expenditure are positively related to
unanticipated changes in the output gap; i.e., they are indeed pro-cyclical. However, it is found
that numerical expenditure rules indeed reduce this pro-cyclical bias. Moreover, the pro-cyclical
spending bias is found to be particularly pronounced for spending items with a high degree of27
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budgetary ﬂexibility, such as subsidies and government investment.
Barrios and Rizza (2010) focus on a diﬀerent dimension, i.e., on the size and the determinants
of unexpected changes in EU countries’ tax revenues and their impact on the ability of EU
governments to use ﬁscal policy as a macroeconomic stabilization device. Tax revenue surprises
are deﬁned as diﬀerences between government plans (as reported in EU stability programmes)
and ex-post outcomes. The paper ﬁnds that countries that have experienced the largest tax
revenue windfalls in the run-up to the 2008/2009 crisis have also tended to run more pro-cyclical
ﬁscal policies. These results tend to indicate that while tax revenue windfalls may be good for
the public purse during favorable times, they may also (paradoxically) lessen the ability of the
countries concerned to run countercyclical ﬁscal policies when cyclical conditions revert.
Finally, Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) propose a survey on the cyclical sensitivity of ﬁscal
policies, which covers papers based on both ex-post and ex-ante data. They show that diﬀerent
results from this literature can be ascribed to diﬀerent modeling choices and data vintages. From
a methodological point of view, they make a case for the use of the standard modeling approach
where the discretionary component of ﬁscal policy is estimated through the use of cyclically
adjusted primary balances.
6 Miscellaneous issues
This section is devoted to reviewing papers that used real-time ﬁscal data but that investigated
- as their main focus - issues not speciﬁcally related to the analysis of data revisions or the
cyclical stance of ﬁscal policies.
Test of Barro’s tax smoothing hypothesis. Loukoianova, Vahey, and Wakerly (2003)i s
one of the ﬁrst papers to introduce real-time data for ﬁscal policy analysis. The authors construct
a real-time dataset for the US government primary balance based on the ‘Economic Report of
the President’ as a complement to the Philadelphia Fed’s real-time dataset. The results indicate
that a tax smoothing approach, augmented by ﬁscal habit considerations, provides an accurate28
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description of US budget balance movements. These ﬁndings are shown to be robust to the use
of ex-post or real-time data for the budget balance.
Deﬁnition of discretionary vs. automatic ﬁscal policy. The idea that automatic sta-
bilizers may depend on actual GDP, while discretionary ﬁscal policy depend on the information
that policy makers have in real-time, is explored by v o nK a l c k r e u t ha n dW o l ﬀ(2011). The
authors assume that the ex-ante information set of policymakers includes GDP data released in
real time. Actual GDP is approximated using the last GDP release. Then, the authors compute
a real-time measurement error on output. According to this approach, discretionary ﬁscal policy
can be expected to react to measurement error on output, whereas automatic ﬁscal policy will
not. This identiﬁcation approach is adopted to test the central identifying assumption of the
seminal structural VAR by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). It is found that that government
expenditure is adjusted upward if GDP in real-time is lower than true GDP.
A similar approach is adopted by Bernoth, Hughes-Hallett, and Lewis (2008), where the
actual stance of ﬁscal policy, measured in this context by the ex-post primary balance ft+1|T in
equation (3), is supposed to react to the ex-post output gap yt+1|T and to the measurement error
made in the real-time evaluation of the output gap. The paper also builds on the assumption
that discretionary ﬁscal policy responds to the real-time output gap while automatic stabilizers
react to the ex-post output level. Based on a panel of 14 OECD countries, the paper ﬁnds lower
estimates of the automatic ﬁscal responses and stronger (and more counter-cyclical) estimates
of the discretionary responses to the output gap.
In relation to these two papers, Darby and M´ elitz (2011) propose an approach to simultane-
ously estimate the automatic and discretionary response of ﬁscal policy to the cycle, based on
the assumption that the automatic ﬁscal reaction to the cycle occurs more quickly (i.e. within
the same year) than discretionary ﬁscal policy. The analysis is based on a panel of 20 OECD
countries for the period 1981-2003. The estimation of ﬁscal policy reaction functions, including
real-time and ex-post values of the output gap, indicates stronger stabilization properties of the29
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government balance than found in the existing literature. This ﬁnding is explained by a stabi-
lizing reaction of several expenditure (including social) items to the cycle - which is generally
neglected in the existing literature (see also Darby and M´ elitz (2008)).
Interdependence of ﬁscal policy plans. The interdependence of ﬁscal policy plans in the
EU countries is investigated in Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008). The authors ﬁrst estimate a ﬁscal
policy rule based on ex-ante data for all variables. Then, they augment the set of control variables
with (an average of) ex-ante plans reported by neighboring EU countries. The idea is that ﬁscal
plans might be interdependent for a variety of reasons, such as direct externalities due to cross-
border public investments, yardstick competition, tax competition and peer pressure among
governments. Results point to empirical evidence of ﬁscal policy interdependence. However,
the interdependence is rather asymmetrically distributed: the ﬁscal plans of the large countries
aﬀect the ﬁscal plans of the small countries, but not vice versa.
Identiﬁcation of government spending shocks in sVAR models. Finally, Cimadomo,
Hauptmeier, and Sola (2011) employ real-time data for US government spending to identify two
diﬀerent types of government spending shocks: (1) spending shocks that are accompanied by
an expected reversal of public spending growth and (2) spending shocks that are accompanied
by expectations of further spending growth. The paper shows that shocks associated with
an expected spending reversal exert expansionary eﬀects on the economy and accelerate the
reduction of public debt. At the same time, shocks associated with a further expected increase
in spending tend to be characterized by a contraction in aggregate demand and a more persistent
increase in public debt.
7 Conclusions
While the empirical research on ﬁscal policy based on real-time data is still relatively narrow,
it has rapidly grown over recent years. This paper surveys this literature. Three main areas of
research are identiﬁed, which focus respectively on: (1) the statistical properties of revisions in30
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ﬁscal data; (2) the political and institutional determinants of data revisions and one-year-ahead
forecast errors and (3) the stance of ﬁscal policies over the economic cycle.
As regards the ﬁrst set of papers, it emerges that revisions in ﬁscal data tend to be large
and can often be predicted based on ex-ante information; i.e., revisions seem to ‘reduce noise’
rather than ‘add news.’ In addition, initial releases by the national statistical authorities are
biased estimates of the ﬁnal values. Most papers in the second group show that strong ﬁscal
rules (for example, establishing tight expenditure ceilings) and institutions (such as medium-
term budgetary frameworks) tend to lead to relatively accurate releases of ﬁscal data and small
deviations of ﬁscal outcomes from governments’ plans. As regards the third set of papers, it
emerges that ﬁscal plans reported at the time of budgeting are now more frequently used to
capture the ex-ante stance of ﬁscal policy. In this context, the ex-ante reaction of ﬁscal policies
to the economic cycle is estimated to be more ‘counter-cyclical’ when real-time data are used
instead of ex-post data.
Looking ahead, the publication and maintenance by central banks and international institu-
tions of datasets including key real-time ﬁscal indicators are fundamental preconditions for the
future development of this strand of empirical research.
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Table 2: Mean absolute value of revisions and of one-year-ahead forecast errors.









Germany 1.15 1.12 0.76 2.34
Belgium 0.68 0.64 0.46 3.40
Austria 1.13 0.79 0.97 3.85
Finland 2.51 1.25 1.30 5.38
Spain 0.66 0.58 0.77 3.83
Greece 0.73 2.94 2.83 13.59
Ireland 1.61 2.12 1.44 4.39
Italy 1.82 1.82 1.44 6.55
France 0.58 0.67 0.62 2.22
Netherlands 0.76 1.20 1.15 6.95
Portugal 1.30 1.56 1.56 4.63
Sweden 1.20 1.72 1.19 4.70
Denmark 0.75 1.18 0.96 6.19
UK 0.81 1.26 0.75 6.33
Norway 1.23 2.77 2.49 9.16
US 1.18 1.65 0.71 4.25
Canada 0.80 1.21 0.88 5.19
Japan 2.18 1.51 1.25 11.82
Australia 0.78 1.18 1.08 2.95
Mean 1.15 1.43 1.19 5.73
Source: Cimadomo (2007). Calculations are based on the
December editions of the OECD Economic Outlook, from







t|t is the revision for the current-year
estimate of, respectively, the output gap, the cyclically ad-
justed primary balance and public debt. u
capb
t|t−1 is the error
for the one-year-ahead forecast of the cyclically adjusted
primary balance (see equation 1).38
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Figure 1: Successive releases of data for the general government budget balance (in % of GDP)
for Greece as reported by Eurostat in the context of the spring and autumn Excessive Deﬁcit
Procedure (EDP) Notiﬁcations. Source: de Castro, P´ erez and Rodr´ ıguez (2011).39
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Figure 2a: Euro area government budget balance
SP 98/99
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Figure 2: Current-year estimates and projections for years t +1 ,t+ 2 and t + 3 for the general
government budget balance, general government expenditures and revenues (all in percentage of
GDP) for the aggregate euro area. Estimates and projections are taken from successive stability
programmes (SP) updates, from 1998/1999 to 2009/2010. Actual outcomes (black-solid lines)
are from the European Commission spring 2010 forecasts.Working PaPer SerieS
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